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Mr. Flynn: That is another chapter in the Government's history of cover-ups on that matter.The Government are attempting to conceal the truth.
The Government dismissed our request for a system of star ratings, saying that such a system would not be perfect as it could not take into account human error. That is a cop-out and an astonishing answer from a Government who introduced imperfect league tables for schools and who wish to monitor standards in every other sphere of life. Comparable standards of survivability for each vessel could be established scientifically--there is no problem with that.
The Select Committee claimed that the star system would give companies a commercial interest in improving safety standards. The Government replied that the firms already had a commercial interest in safety standards because of the disastrous effects of accidents on business. That is nonsense: the ferry trade has suffered no adverse effects as a result of recent disasters. The Government dismissed the Zeebrugge ferry disaster as "human error" and the Estonia disaster was blamed on Johnny foreigner. Zeebrugge was a cheap disaster for the ferry industry, costing only £90 million--which was shared in the industry--and the Government have conspired to build public confidence in an inherently dangerous ferry design. One should compare that cost with the £1 million a day that ferries can make crossing the English channel in summer.
The Select Committee requested that full safety information about each vessel be used in publicity material and displayed on each ship. The Government, hilariously, said that they would publish a list and create
a hotline for public inquiries. Presumably it will be like the cones hotline. The Select Committee recommended the publication of comparative safety assessments of new and bigger high-speed vessels. The Government said no and declared that they are happy with the present IMO and other rules. However, they will examine the safety of high-speed craft. The channel tunnel had to undergo a safety assessment--that is the only way of achieving proper safety standards. Bigger and faster vessels are being built, as we saw on television a few days ago. They will carry more people and there is the potential for even greater disaster.
Mr. Mackinlay:
My hon. Friend and I are interested in fair competition. Does he agree that there is disparity of treatment in this case? The operators of the channel tunnel were forced to adopt very strict safety standards--and they were proud to do it--but their competitors,the ferries, are allowed to get away with action that is commercially and competitively unfair.
Mr. Flynn:
My hon. Friend is absolutely right and the Select Committee reached the same conclusion.
Safety has improved somewhat, but it has deteriorated as well. Evidence of that deterioration was provided by the sea safety group--a body of international shipowners, pilots and captains. It said that the money-spinning services were increasing to a worrying degree and that, by maximising facilities to boost profits, designers had created their own "Hampton court maze" on ships for passengers. The group asked: if professional sailors did not know how to find their way around the ships, how on earth would people be able to muster in the event of a disaster? It supported the Select Committee's report and argued for all the improvements that we suggested, including the star system.
Presumably in answer to our request for a practice evacuation involving 1,000 people, an exercise took place at Dover. The Government have stuck to their claim that it should take only 30 minutes to evacuate a vessel: that is their benchmark. The Dover evacuation involved a group of young, able-bodied people--some of whom pretended to be disabled. They knew what was to happen and the evacuation took place in daylight while the boat was tied to the quay. Instead of evacuating 2,000 people from the vessel in 30 minutes, it is reported that only315 were evacuated in that time.
Mr. David Shaw:
That is total rubbish. Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Flynn:
I shall not give way to the hon. Gentleman, as he can make his own speech. I refer to the only report that I have about the evacuation from The Mail on Sunday. It cited that figure.
Mr. Shaw:
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. That is total rubbish. I was there; the hon. Gentleman was not. It is absolute rubbish.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Janet Fookes):
Order. The hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Shaw) knows perfectly well that that is not a point of order. However, it may be a point for debate and, if the hon. Gentleman seeks to catch my eye, I may be able to help him.
Mr. Flynn:
The Mail on Sunday of 14 January said:
The chief executive of the Marine Safety Agency, who was monitoring the exercise, said:
Would people move more quickly in the event of a real disaster? Rather than a group of fit, young people, passengers would usually constitute a mixture of humanity--the very young and the very old, the disabled, many who were fast asleep, some who were drunk, some who were pregnant. All would be terrified. Paramedics were on hand during that exercise, and all of those involved knew exactly what was occurring.
Yet even in that useless and hopelessly artificial exercise, nowhere near 2,000 people were evacuated within 30 minutes. The disasters that the exercise was designed to mimic almost always occur on the open sea, at night and perhaps in storm conditions. There may be a fire or the boat may list or capsize in the water.The exercise at Dover was rigged and of no value--although it proved our point.
Ministers will make much of the recent negotiations. The experts who inquired into the Estonia disaster recommended that ferries be allowed to remain afloat with 50 centimetres of water on the car deck. The IMO rejected that recommendation, but it agreed to adopt SOLAS 90 standards worldwide for all ro-ro ferries. In preparing for the debate, I asked several independent bodies with expertise in the field for their impressions on the present position.
The Royal Institute of Naval Architects told me:
Who would know whether there was 51 or 49 cm of water on the car deck? The only real solution must involve sponsons, bulkheads, and longitudinal, transverse or increased buoyancy chambers on the boat.
According to the Royal Institute of Naval Architects:
The Royal Academy of Engineering is
So there is already a compromise on safety standards.
The Consumers Association, which has been studying the matter most productively for many years, said that
I press the Government to rethink the star system and the survivability and buoyancy standards that the Select Committee requested. Will they unilaterally adopt the50 cm rule, inadequate as it is, even if other European countries do not accept it? Will they provide a timetable for any modifications? The Consumers Association is arguing for spring 1998 at the latest. Do the Government
accept that? Do they accept the lack of a link between evacuation time and the survivability of ferries inSOLAS 90 and the new 50 cm proposal? That was a fatal flaw.
My hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke made grave allegations about the Government. He said that their failure to implement the Donaldson report made them responsible for the catastrophe in Milford Haven. We all look on horrified and impotent as we witness an environmental catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. We know what it has already done to nature and the beaches there. On present damage, they will probably not be free of pollution for many years. The damage to the tourist industry is incalculable, but we know what happened in Brittany and Cornwall when the Torrey Canyon spilled its oil. It could be far worse in Milford Haven.
"At the prescribed 30-minute point, when everyone should have been in the life-rafts, only an estimated 315 were clear of the ship".
21 Feb 1996 : Column 289
"If this had been a matter of life and death, they would have gone down more rapidly".
"The assumption of 50 centimetres of water on the car deck has to be seen for what it is; a wholly arbitrary standard imposed in panic by the Scandinavians after the Estonia disaster."
"Some ferries . . . are unlikely to collect that amount of water(50 cm) except in unreasonably severe collision conditions . . . However, . . . many ferries could collect such water (50 cm) with a simple collision, suggesting that it is not enough!"
"not satisfied that significant progress has been made:
--there is no agreement that the evacuation time should be the criterion for the period that the ships remain upright
--the basis for agreement, if reached on a Regional Basis . . . will probably invoke significantly smaller volumes of water than recommended by the Panel of Experts."
"operators should be allowed a maximum of two refit periods to implement changes to existing ferries which would bring us to Spring of 1998. Events after that would be over three years after the Estonia disaster. The key point here is that precious time has already been lost: a decision must be taken urgently before more lives are sacrificed unnecessarily."
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