| Home Page |
Column 235
House of Commons
Wednesday 3 May 1995
The House met at Ten o'clock
PRAYERS
[ Madam Speaker-- in the Chair ]
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.-- [Mr. Wells.]
10.4 am
Mr. Llew Smith (Blaenau Gwent): This year marks the 25th anniversary of the non-proliferation treaty, which was established to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to find a way foward to complete nuclear disarmament.
This summer also sees the 50th anniversary of the explosion of two atomic bombs on Japan. On 6 August 1945, an atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, killing more than 140,000 people. Some three days later, another atom bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, killing more than 70,000 people. As someone said, in the central square mile of each one of those cities, nine out of 10 people died; and 90 per cent. of the dead were not soldiers or politicians: they were children, mothers and grey-haired old men and women.
The message that came from a recent anniversary of that bombing was, "Step back and learn from us." Those world leaders who are participating in the non-proliferation treaty conference in New York, which is now drawing to a close, have the opportunity to do just that--to step back and learn not just from that tragedy but from many other tragedies that have afflicted our people over the years. When the British ambassador commended the non- proliferation treaty to the United Nations General Assembly in 1968, he said:
"I cannot prove the nuclear powers' sincerity. An act of faith rather than objective data is required. I accept that when they pledge themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race at an early date, they mean what they say." The ambassador was summarising article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, which envisages a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons.
Some 27 years later, the United Nations Secretary-General, opening the non- proliferation treaty conference, said:
"The most safe, sure and swift way to deal with the threat of nuclear arms is to do away with them in every regard. This should be our vision of the future. No more testing. No more production. No more sales or transfers. Reduction and destruction of all nuclear weapons and the means to make them should be humanity's common cause."
How does the Government's present proliferation policy stand up against those two comments? For instance, in the debate on the Royal Navy in February this year, the Minister of State for Defence Procurement said:
"We all want to work for the reduction and the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons."
Column 236
That filled me with some optimism, as it complied with article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. But that optimism was quickly dashed because, within seconds, the same Minister said:"One of the main tenets of our policy is that we should retain our nuclear deterrent while any other country in a position to threaten our security possesses a nuclear weapon or the ability to construct a nuclear weapon."-- [ Official Report , 16 February 1995; Vol. 254, c. 1146.]
That obviously breaks article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. Some statements, even from those on the Opposition Front Bench, fill me with dismay. Writing about the world's stock of nuclear weapons, the shadow Secretary of State for Defence said:
"Until the elimination of these stocks is achieved, Labour will retain Britain's nuclear capability."
Both the Government and the Opposition seem to be saying that Britain will be the last country to give up its nuclear weapons. That is in stark contrast to a decision taken at a recent Labour party conference that we, as a future Government, would, among other things, scrap Trident.
A month ago in Washington, the Prime Minister met President Clinton. The Prime Minister boasted about the continuing closeness of the Anglo-American relationship. He told one journalist:
"If you were to spend a weekend on one of our nuclear submarines, you would find a Trident missile on it. I'm not sure you could travel on anyone else's submarine and find a Trident missile on it". He emphasised that that was a
"practical illustration of the extent of the closeness of the defence, security and other relationships between the United Kingdom and the United States".
That "practical illustration", however, is also a violation by both the UK and the United States of America of article I of the non-proliferation treaty, which states:
"Each nuclear weapons state, party to the treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipients whatsoever, nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons, or explosive devices, directly, or indirectly."
In a debate in December, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Simpson) exposed the detailed way in which the British Trident programme was dependent on United States technical support and equipment. The purchase of Trident--those missiles that the Prime Minister referred to on British submarines--is certainly a transfer of a military weapon system.
The examples highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, South and, indeed, the Prime Minister are both breaches of article I of the non- proliferation treaty. That is not just my opinion; it is the conclusion of countries such as Mexico, which has expressed that view at the conference that is going on in New York. What is particularly disgraceful about the continued military co-operation between the United States and the UK is that those countries are two of the three depositary states for the non- proliferation treaty. In effect, the treaty is held in trust by them. How do they show that respect? By breaking the very first article of the treaty.
An argument exists that we should agree to an indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty. I am opposed to that, because it would remove any leverage by the non-nuclear powers to pressurise nuclear weapons powers to negotiate nuclear disarmament.
Column 237
As if being put in the diplomatic dock over US-UK nuclear collaboration were not enough, the Government have colluded to ensure that this country has also violated the second part of article I of the non-proliferation treaty, which reads:"Each nuclear weapon state party to the treaty undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce, any non nuclear weapon state to manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices".
Article II of the treaty goes on to establish a complementary commitment by the non-nuclear power states not to receive assistance in nuclear weapons manufacture, or otherwise to acquire nuclear weapons.
It is obviously true that Iraq violated its commitment under article II, as the UN special commission's investigation has made clear, but, according to David Kay, one of the team leaders, the role of British companies was vital to Iraq's efforts to enrich uranium for nuclear warheads. Dr. John Gordon, who was head of the nuclear energy department of the Foreign Office from 1986 to 1988--so one would expect him to know something about these matters --argued in a letter to The Independent on 21 November 1992 that the UK Government were complicit with Iraq in breaching article I. For example, in February 1989, two years before the fighting in the gulf, the private secretary to the right hon. Member for Bristol, West (Mr. Waldegrave), the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, who was then a junior Foreign Office Minister, wrote to then Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe's office, stating:
"you may wish to show the Secretary of State the attached papers concerning a potentially politically-sensitive export to Iraq. The machinery in question has legitimate civil uses, but could also be employed in munitions manufacture"--
here is the important and nuclear connection--
"or even in uranium enrichment. Mr. Waldegrave's inclination is to support the recommendation that applications are approved. He has commented that screwdrivers are also required to make hydrogen bombs."
Mr. Paul Flynn (Newport, West): Does my hon. Friend recall that, five months before the Gulf war, the then Foreign Secretary told me, in answer to a request to beef up inspections of the Iraqi nuclear programme, that Iraq was a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty? The Government told me that they had full confidence that Iraq would abide by its obligations and that it was not working to manufacture nuclear weapons. If the Gulf war had not taken place, Iraq would have had nuclear weapons by now.
Mr. Alan Simpson (Nottingham, South): Iraq would probably have had screwdrivers as well.
Mr. Smith: I have no doubt that, by now, Iraq would have had nuclear weapons and, in all probability, screwdrivers.
Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby): I am following the hon. Gentleman's argument with interest, but does not the intervention of the hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) reveal the flaw in that argument? People can sign the treaty, but it would be foolish for to us abandon our weapons in a one-sided manner while people sign the treaty in less than good faith. The Government have said,
Column 238
"We would like to, and will, abandon our weapons, but only when everyone else does so at the same time." That is a sensible position. The one-sided argument always goes against the protection of our nation, and is bizarre.Mr. Smith: We cannot continue to tell non-nuclear power states or non-nuclear weapons states that they should not have those weapons of war, if, at the same time, this country does not make any effort to negotiate away its own stock of nuclear weapons. That is an act of hypocrisy on our part. It would be an act of naivety on the part of the non-nuclear power states if they continued to accept such an argument.
Mr. Robathan: Surely it would be naive of us to say, "Look. We will give up all our weapons. Now, of course, the rest of world will do so." As the hon. Member for Newport, West rightly said, if we had not gone to war in Iraq, by now it would have nuclear weapons. Does the hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Smith) believe that Iraq would not use them?
Mr. Smith: We had nuclear weapons, but it did not seem to deter Iraq from going to war. I seem to remember one Mr. Gorbachev some years ago taking some important unilateral initiatives on nuclear disarmament, which had a positive effect throughout the world.
Mr. Flynn: The whole point of my intervention was to stress that the naivety was that of the British Government in the 1980s not beefing up inspection under the treaty. There is nothing wrong with the treaty, and countries such as France and China have engaged in disarmament, but the problem is that we need a treaty that is transparent.
Mr. Smith: By sheer coincidence, inspection was my next point. The shadow Foreign Secretary, writing in New Statesman and Society , argued for a much tougher regime to enforce compliance with the non-proliferation treaty through inspection at short notice of any nuclear installations, whether or not the state had admitted to their existence. He said that Iraq had got away with its nuclear weapons programme because safeguards were applied only to its officially declared facilities.
That is true, but it is not the full truth. If the major supplier states such as the United States, Germany and Switzerland had not turned a collective blind eye to the export of that equipment to Iraq, sometimes through a third country, intrusive inspections of the assembled equipment would be less of a problem or requirement. As the Scott inquiry has shown, some British Ministers even encouraged support for Iraq's nuclear programme.
In relation to the problem of sensitive technology exports, last week I received a comprehensive report entitled "Proliferation and Export Controls" by Saferworld, a foreign affairs think tank that is based in London. The report highlights huge discrepancies between controls imposed on sensitive or dual-use technology. It shows, for instance, that, of the 73 countries designated as "sensitive" for exports by Germany, Japan, the United States and the UK, only 30 appeared on all four countries' restricted list. If the Minister has read that report, will he please comment on those findings? In New York, the Foreign Secretary announced that the United Kingdom had ceased production of fissile materials for explosive purposes. That decision is full of loopholes, the first of which is that, for nearly 20 years, the main feedstock for new British warheads has been recycled plutonium from dismantled warheads.
Column 239
Does the Minister agree that the thremal oxide reprocessing plant--THORP--will add tens of thousands of kilograms of plutonium to the stockpile, which at Sellafield already amounts to 80,000 kg? Is not THORP's significant reprocessing capacity bound to add to the safeguards problem? Does the hon. Gentleman agree with an editorial in the Financial Times , which said:"Efforts also need to be made to curb production of reactor grade plutonium, produced by plants such as THORP, since this can readily be converted into bombs, using modern technology"?
The second loophole in Britain's offer to halt military fissile material production results from the so-called tripartite agreement between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency. For example, Parliament was told in 1983 that article XIV of the agreement allowed for the withdrawal of civil material from the safeguards for reasons of national security. In January 1994, I was told that the Government had activated that clause 571 times since May 1979, and that 70 of those withdrawals involved plutonium. We also know, because of an admission by the American Government last June, that reactor grade plutonium has been tested in a nuclear weapon. Will the Minister block that loophole? Otherwise, THORP and Sellafield will remain a huge potential plutonium mine for the military.
The third loophole is provided by the recent extension for a further 10 years of the clauses of the 1958 mutual defence agreement on atomic energy, which allows the United States and the United Kingdom to barter explosive nuclear materials. That loophole allows each country to make up any perceived nuclear explosive material shortfall in the other, and unless it is closed it will undermine the non-proliferation goals of the cut-off convention.
An Indian defence expert said of the non-proliferation treaty: "Ultimately it comes to a single issue. In today's world do we still need weapons of mass destruction? Should terror be the only way to achieve stability? Do we still need to divide countries on whether they possess destructive weapons and assign separate duties and responsibilities? Would such a division in perpetuity be in the interest of the world?"
Finally, I pay tribute to all the organisations, such as Greenpeace, the Acronym Consortium and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, that are still campaigning for a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons--especially CND, which is continuing the argument in connection with the present non- proliferation treaty conference. Next week, on 10, 11 and 12 May, not many yards away from Parliament, Janet Bloomfield will fast for a nuclear-free world. I am sure that all hon. Friends and hon. Members will want to give Janet all the support possible, and then to join her and other members of CND in marching to the French embassy to protest against nuclear testing.
In my opinion, nuclear weapons constitute the most important issue that the House could consider. There is an obligation on each and every one of us to ensure that in the months and years ahead something positive comes out of the treaty, so that we can leave to our children a planet at least as beautiful and as safe as the one that we inherited.
10.24 am
Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby): The hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Smith) spoke with integrity and honesty, which one can respect. He has honestly told us that he has not changed his views over the years; they remain the same as they were 20 years ago. I agree with
Column 240
what he said about wishing to pass on a planet and a country as beautiful and as nice to live in as they are now-- indeed, I hope that they may be better.However, the hon. Gentleman has totally missed the point. I did not intend to speak in the debate, but I am spurred to do so by his comments. At no stage did he mention the possibility that the defence of the United Kingdom might be important to its inhabitants. He never said that the odd threat and the odd danger existed beyond the shores of the United Kingdom, and that those threats might not respond to the logic and charm of his speech.
The defence of the United Kingdom is possibly the most important role of any Government of whatever political hue. The defence of the realm has always been stated to be the first business of Government. The hon. Gentleman implies that, by possessing nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom poses a threat to world peace. History reveals that that is not true. Since we have had nuclear weapons--we have had them for nearly 50 years now--we have neither deployed them nor threatened to use them. We have kept them in the background; we have spoken softly but carried a big stick, which we could use if we were ever threatened.
Mr. Llew Smith: The hon. Gentleman talks about the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Would he be willing to press the button to start them off? If so, what would be the consequences, and what would be the possibility of leaving our children a safer world than the one that we inherited? Finally, at whom does he think those nuclear weapons would be pointed and fired?
Mr. Robathan: The hon. Gentleman may know that I spent 15 years in the British Army. During that time, my view was that, when nuclear weapons were used it would be time to pack up and go home, because that would be the end of it. The question of first use is interesting, and the Government have been right never to say, "We shall never use nuclear weapons first," because, if one does that, one gives away the whole purpose of having the weapons. Instead, we say, "We have nuclear weapons; I trust that nobody will wish to use them against us."
Mr. Smith: Would you press the button?
Mr. Robathan: I would not personally be willing to do that-- [Hon. Members:-- "Oh!"]--but if I were a Minister I would not be in a position to say that, because Ministers must maintain a bland face and say, "We have nuclear weapons"--
Mr. Smith: Nuclear weapons are a deterrent only if the other side knows that one is willing to use them. The hon. Gentleman has just admitted that, if he were responsible, he would refuse to press the button, so nuclear weapons cannot be a deterrent. It is as simple as that.
Mr. Robathan: The hon. Gentleman is wrong. I did not say that I would not use nuclear weapons if I were responsible. I said that, personally, I would not use them at the moment. However, the Government must maintain a bland face and say, "We have nuclear weapons. They are there to be used if necessary." Of course the Government must say that. Otherwise, we might just as well not have nuclear weapons.
The Government have never used nuclear weapons, nor have they threatened to use them. Over the past 50 years, although it may have escaped the hon. Gentleman's notice,
Column 241
we have not been invaded, and we have lived in peace--an advantage that our parents, grandparents and even our great grandparents never enjoyed. Surely that points to some flaw in the hon. Gentleman's argument that nuclear weapons cause war and are a threat to peace. We have enjoyed peace partly because of nuclear deterrence.Mr. Simpson: May I remind the hon. Gentleman that the debate is about the conference on the extension of the non-proliferation treaty, and the extent to which the world recognises that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to global stability? May I take him back to his experience in the armed forces, and ask him whether, in the multiplicity of civil and regional wars, of which he will have much closer knowledge than I, he can identify one context in which the United Kingdom's possession of nuclear weapons helped to deter or to end such wars?
Mr. Robathan: I am well aware that we are discussing the nuclear non -proliferation treaty--that is the point: we already possess nuclear weapons. Nobody would wish to see the spread of nuclear weapons--I am sure that the hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent would agree with that. I wish to see them reduced.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether the United Kingdom's possession of nuclear weapons had ever prevented war in regional conflicts. We have not been involved in a war which might have needed nuclear weapons, or called for them to be used, because we have possessed them. It is self-evident--we did not come to blows with the former Soviet Union, despite its evangelical creed of pushing revolution and communism around the world.
The former Soviet Union says so. Documents from the former Soviet Union reveal how generals were planning to invade the west. They may have been lunatic generals, but they were generals in the former Soviet Union. Those plans were never put into effect, because we stood firm and did not say, "Of course we will not defend ourselves."
We had to have nuclear weapons then against a tangible threat. What is the threat now? The hon. Gentleman mentioned proliferation. The threat lies with countries such as Iraq, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned and which has been working for nuclear weapons for many years. I think that it was in 1980 that Israel bombed a nuclear plant in Iraq for that very reason.
We all wish to get rid of nuclear weapons. The Minister of State for Defence Procurement said:
"We all want to work for the reduction and the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons."--[ Official Report , 16 February 1995;Vol. 254, c. 1146.]
I agree with that, and, as a soldier, I would certainly have wished to see that. It is not much fun being a soldier in a noddy suit quietly frying away in a nuclear holocaust, any more than it would be for a child in the street.
We talk about reducing our nuclear weapons, and it is right that we should not know the exact numbers we possess--in Britain they amount to a few hundred nuclear warheads. The states of the former Soviet Union and the United States of America have thousands of warheads. As they start to negotiate a reduction in their warheads, it is right and proper that we should look at our numbers. We do not form an entity with the United States of America; we are a separate country--I know
Column 242
that all Opposition Members would agree with that. We must take into account our own interests, which are to protect ourselves. The hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent showed an astonishing naivety. His speech revealed that, over the past 20, 30, or 50 years, some people have learnt nothing. It is evident that CND has learnt nothing from the recent past. The hon. Gentleman's speech could have been made at any time in the past 30 years; it took no account of the collapse of the Soviet Union or the deployment of cruise missiles. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman and his friends in CND would and did argue against the deployment of cruise missiles, which, as has been revealed and as history will judge, was one of the factors that led to the breakdown of the Soviet Union as a major and threatening power.I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would have opposed the Gulf war in 1991-- he will correct me if I am wrong. His naivety is again revealed. What would Saddam Hussein have done if he had been allowed to continue invading, and controlled 40 per cent. of the world's oil reserves? He would have built nuclear weapons and used them against us. Contrary to what the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues may think, Saddam Hussein is not a charming, cuddly teddy bear, but an extremely unpleasant dictator.
Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Robathan: Of course I shall give way to the true voice of the Labour party.
Mr. Corbyn: I thank that hon. Gentleman for his comment--perhaps the Labour party's Front-Bench team will listen carefully to what he said.
Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to 1987 and 1988, when a very small number of Labour Back Benchers, including myself, were actively arguing for an arms embargo against Iraq and were raising the issues of human rights and chemical warfare in Iraq, and the attack on Halabjah and the treatment of the Kurdish people by Iraq? The British Government said that trade came first, and they would not introduce a trade embargo or anything else against Iraq. The hon. Gentleman should think a little bit about the history before making facile comments about the current position.
Mr. Robathan: I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for his integrity over the subject, for adopting an approach that is straight down the line, and for always holding that line. There are many countries with whom we might not have been trading. Perhaps we should never have traded with the Soviet Union as a whole, especially as we hear more awful tales coming out of the gulag. Would the hon. Gentleman say that we must not trade with China, which is employing fearsome and unpleasant tactics? We should not have been arming Iraq, and we did not.
The hon. Gentleman said that my comments were facile. I went to Iraq with the British Army in 1991, and I saw a vast array of weaponry in Iraq and Kuwait that was used by the Iraqi forces. But I saw no British weapons. I saw French Pumas, many MiGs, a vast array of eastern bloc, Soviet Union tanks, but no British weaponry. I know that the supergun was stopped here by the Government. We did not arm Iraq.
Column 243
The hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) tries to throw dirt at his own country and say that it was our fault. I was injected against fearful things, such as anthrax, which Saddam Hussein might have used. The idea that anthrax could have been used in warfare is so horrific as to be almost unthinkable, but Saddam Hussein would have used it. It did not come from Britain. His chemical warfare potential came not from Britain, but from other countries. Instead of for ever running down his own country, the hon. Gentleman might consider the record of history, which will prove us right.Mr. Flynn: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Robathan: I am always delighted to give way to the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Flynn: There is an endless litany of equipment that Britain supplied to Iraq, including tank tracks, the precursor chemicals for both chemical and biological weapons, radar equipment and sophisticated heat- seeking equipment. There is a range of equipment, that I could list until the end of the debate. The hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong to suggest that Britain did not supply Saddam Hussein with a range of weapons of war.
Mr. Robathan: The hon. Gentleman says that there is a list, I cannot comment on the exact details of the equipment, as I cannot extract them from my memory, but the hon. Gentleman's list in terms of quantity and worth is nonsense. We did not supply Saddam Hussein with the bulk of his weaponry, which was from the eastern bloc. I wish that we could hear the hon. Gentleman condemn the eastern bloc and those countries that supplied Saddam Hussein.
We were discussing nuclear proliferation. I am glad to see that no Opposition Member has denied that Saddam Hussein is keen on having nuclear weapons, that he is difficult to pin down and untrustworthy. That is why I say that the fact that they would have opposed the Gulf war shows great naivety. They would have let Saddam Hussein build up his nuclear arsenal, and would have seen him use it.
I shall go back further than the Gulf war and the second world war, to disarmament in the 1930s. Most people would say that disarmament in Britain in the 1930s acted as a signal to the powers of the Axis that perhaps Britain was not interested in fighting. The House will recall the famous Oxford union debate, where it was said that disarmament acted as a great signal to Hitler that this House would not fight for king and country.
Mr. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South): Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the left in this country, including Michael Foot, were actively engaged in calling for collective security against fascism, and that the Conservative Government appeased Nazism at that time--just as Conservative Governments are inclined to appease brutal regimes such as the Chinese regime today?
Mr. Robathan: I would not accept that. I would say that the hon. Gentleman's reading of history is slightly flawed--very flawed, in fact. I have a history degree, and I can assure him that that is not the way that I read it. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman has a history degree. However, let us not get bogged down.
Column 244
Just as in the 1930s those who argued for disarmament were wrong, so in the 1990s those who say that we should one- sidedly, unilaterally, disarm are wrong. Yes, we would all like to see a world without war, particularly nuclear war, but the world is not like that.How pleasant it would be if, for once, Opposition Members put the defence of the United Kingdom at the top of their list, instead of for ever knocking the Government and suggesting that there must be something wrong because the Government retain weapons that can defend the United Kingdom. I too would like to see nuclear proliferation stopped. I would like our nuclear weapons to be reduced as they are reduced around the world, and if it were possible to abolish them completely, that would be welcome.
Today, we have again seen the true face of the Labour party. I am grateful to Opposition Members for revealing that what we have read about Labour party policy is not the same as that which really dwells on the Back Benches of the Labour party.
10.42 am
Mr. Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow): I am glad to be able to make a brief contribution to the debate. I will be brief because other hon. Members wish to speak. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Smith) on obtaining the debate, and on his speech opening it.
I shall make my position clear at the beginning. I have been a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament for many years, and I am a member of its national council. I support Labour party policy, as expressed at our most recent conference, on scrapping Trident. The debate is supposed to be about the non-proliferation treaty, but not very much of the last speech was about it. It seems that the indefinite extension of the treaty is likely to be presented to us as a success. We need to ask whether the indefinite extension of the treaty, without any changes in the policies that have been adopted through the past 25 years of its existence, represents success, and whether we should not instead say that, positive though the treaty has been, we should move forward, to change and develop those policies.
The fundamental problem, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent pointed out, is the contradiction in the policies of the major nuclear powers, including the UK. We tell other countries who are potential proliferators that they must not have nuclear weapons, that they are not legitimate and unnecessary for their security. Yet at the same time, we pursue policies that say that we cannot have security without nuclear weapons. That is a fundamental contradiction.
As has been pointed out already, in the past few years, we have not merely retained the nuclear weapons we had. Trident itself was proliferation, because it has more warheads and more targets can be hit. Of course the yield of nuclear weapons was higher in the 1970s, but Trident can hit six times as many targets as Polaris. The recent announcements that we will scrap the free-fall bomb and that we will not produce new fissile materials seem to be designed more to persuade some people at the NPT conference to accept indefinite extension rather than as a real change of policy.
Column 245
What about security guarantees? Why is it that we are not prepared to give unconditional guarantees of no first use against non-nuclear states? The statement on 5 April by the UK and other nuclear powers still contains a long, long list of exceptions. It may be argued that, by guaranteeing security for countries potentially threatened by nuclear-armed enemies, we are persuading them that they do not need to develop their own nuclear weapons. I believe that the only context in which that argument might possibly have been valid was in the situation that existed during the cold war.Over the past few years, did close relationships with the US or the existence of the non-proliferation treaty prevent Israel or Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons? Why will those states not admit that they are nuclear powers? Why do such states seek nuclear capability? Israel still refuses to admit to such a capability, even though Mordecai Vanunu has spent years in solitary confinement for exposing Israel's nuclear programme. It wanted to acquire nuclear weapons because of its regional and local conflicts.
Consider what the Foreign Secretary said recently about the need to resist aggression having taken this country to war four times this century:
"looking at the world as it is now . . . I am driven to the conclusion that most of the difficult choices facing us will in future arise not from acts of aggression, but from disasters within a nation state."--[ Official Report , 23 February 1993; Vol. 219, c. 773.]
I would suggest that it is not only disasters within nation states but regional conflicts that present the greatest problems. We can imagine the dangers of proliferation to countries where the potential proliferators are neighbours with long histories of conflict. Iraq has already been mentioned. Iraq was crushed, but, as has been pointed out, if it had not invaded Kuwait, Iraq would have had nuclear weapons by now.
What would be the potential for conflict in Israel or Pakistan if their neighbours had nuclear weapons? That is precisely the sort of situation we may well be faced with if proliferation is not stopped. Mass proliferation has not happened yet, but I do not believe that that should give us confidence that it will not happen in future. We are dealing with what is now an old technology. There are massive stocks of plutonium and evidence of illegal trading in it. One of the basic flaws in the existing non- proliferation treaty is that its emphasis leads to the export of nuclear technologies for power generation. It is one of the trade-offs of the NPT that countries such as North Korea are told not to develop nuclear weapons, but that we will help them acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
That ignores the very thin dividing lines, if such dividing lines exist at all, between so-called civil and military plutonium. Such dividing lines exist more on paper and in facile arguments than in reality. As my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent pointed out, the US Department of Energy has now admitted that a nuclear test was carried out in 1962 using so-called civil plutonium.
The major weakness of the present approach is the failure clearly to link an extension of the non-proliferation treaty with disarmament. I believe, with my hon. Friend
| Next Section
| Home Page |