House of Commons Hansard Debates for 10 Feb 1992

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow) : Perhaps the Secretary of State will tell me that I am wrong or that I am being unduly harsh, but discussions have been going round and round, as it were, ever since the Burgoyne report. Why has the procedure taken so long? Am I missing something or am I asking a reasonable question?

Mr. Howard : That is a reasonable question to ask and there is a simple answer. The answer is that since we have had Lord Cullen's report everything has been done and is being done to implement the recommendations as soon as practicable. The discussions and the review to which I have referred are focused on the most effective way of implementing the recommendations set out in the report. Lord Cullen recognised that it would take a considerable time before these matters were put in place. The hon. Gentleman will recognise that responsibility for taking forward the recommendations is rightly in the hands of the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive. The hon. Gentleman will be fully aware of the tripartite composition of the commission.

Mr. Robert Hughes (Aberdeen, North) : Will the Secretary of State explain why proper legislative

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protection against victimisation is almost the only recommendation of Lord Cullen that the Government have still not implemented?

Mr. Howard : As it happens, I am just about to deal with victimisation. The hon. Gentleman will see that his question is answered.

As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) has said, another of Lord Cullen's recommendations was that safety representatives should be protected against victimisation. In order to fulfil this recommendation, the Government intend to amend employment protection legislation to ensure that representatives who have been dismissed or otherwise victimised because of their safety role can gain redress through an industrial tribunal. But such legislation falls outside the scope of the Bill, which deals with safety matters rather than employment issues. We shall take the matter forward as soon as a suitable legislative vehicle becomes available.

Victimisation of workers who raise safety concerns is completely unacceptable. It undermines the objective of increased safety awareness. Where there is clear evidence of intimidation, the HSE will investigate it because it could indicate weaknesses in the safety management system. The name and address of an offshore inspector is displayed on every offshore installation and if workers contact the HSE anonymity is guaranteed if requested. If health and safety standards are being threatened, the HSE would take the necessary enforcement action where there is sufficient evidence of intimidation.

Mr. Peter Bottomley (Eltham) : I think that there will be a general welcome from hon. Members on both sides of the House for my right hon. and learned Friend's announcement that there will be further legislation to cover employment matters. Will the information that is made available about health and safety and the inspector be made available also on onshore, non- oil areas of employment ? To take up his remarks about operators being required to finance the training of safety representatives, do the Government intend to continue their funding of the trade union movement so that trade unions can undertake some of the training themselves and give support to the non-oil related representatives at the workplace as well ?

Mr. Howard : On my hon. Friend's first point, I have recently received a request from the general secretary of the Trades Union Congress for the Government to continue their grant towards its training activities. I am considering that request and I shall make my response known in due course. On his second point, I am not entirely convinced that it is necessary to have the same information available at all onshore facilities, but I shall consider the matter.

Mr. Salmond : The Secretary of State says, as he has before, that the victimisation investigated and established is unacceptable to the Government. He said that there would be an amendment to employment legislation to allow the matter to go to industrial tribunals. What penalties would be available against either the operators or the oil companies that were found guilty of victimisation of workers, whether or not they were safety representatives? If the Government find victimisation so

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unacceptable, what penalties will be available under the changes that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is proposing?

Mr. Howard : If, for example, a worker were dismissed because he had made a complaint to the HSE, he could bring proceedings for unfair dismissal on the basis of constructive dismissal. He could obtain considerable compensation from an industrial tribunal.

Mr. Malcolm Bruce (Gordon) : Does the Secretary of State accept that, in a sense, legislation to deal with that issue is at least as urgent as the need for the Bill? He will be aware of the case of Mr. Colin Jewell, which has been well publicised. He took his complaint about safety faults to the HSE. It was investigated and upheld, but he is now unable to find employment in the North sea. He has no compensation and no security. Because of that, many people are not prepared to make complaints about safety problems and safety design faults, even though they see them every day.

Mr. Howard : I agree that it is important that Lord Cullen's recommendation is put into effect as soon as possible--and it will be as soon as a suitable legislative vehicle is available. The Bill does not provide that vehicle. We shall ensure that the law is changed to provide the protection to which hon. Members have referred, as soon as it is possible to do so.

Mr. Tony Blair (Sedgefield) : I apologise for interrupting the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Will he confirm that there are no procedural reasons why the issue of victimisation should not be included in the Bill? If someone is being victimised, and he is a safety representative, surely it is as important for safety reasons as for employment reasons to ensure that the matter is covered in the Bill.

Mr. Howard : The safety aspects have been considered and, as I have said, they are covered by the extent to which anonymous complaints can be made to the HSE. Therefore, the direct safety aspects are covered already. We have been advised that the matter is outside the scope of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman will readily appreciate that a Bill that covers employment issues would be subject to amendment on a whole range of issues. That could delay the passage of the Bill, to which we attach considerable importance. I must make it clear that we intend to legislate to cover Lord Cullen's victimisation recommendation as soon as it is possible to do so.

Mr. Robert Hughes : The right hon. and learned Gentleman's reply simply does not wash. He knows that both the long title and the short title of the Bill are entirely in the Government's hands and that there is no statutory reason why the Bill should not cover victimisation. I accept his point that if employment provisions were attached to the Bill that could widen its scope, but he knows that the Bill has the good will of the House and that we would not want to delay it. It was irresponsible of him to suggest that the Opposition would create procedural difficulties to delay the Bill ; it was wrong to give that impression. With the agreement of the Opposition, the issue of victimisation could be dealt with here and now.

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Mr. Howard : I do not think that the hon. Gentleman fully understood the point that I was making. I certainly was not making any accusations about the Opposition's attitude. Employment issues arouse concern in all parts of the House, and many individual right hon. and hon. Members-- regardless of the attitude taken by members of the Opposition Front Bench-- might want to use employment legislation as a vehicle for changing employment law in one of a number of respects. That is clearly a possibility, in respect of which it would not be possible for members of the Opposition Front Bench to give any assurance, and it could lead to delay. We want the legislation to be on the statute book as soon as possible--and we do not want to risk delay on that account.

Mr. Peter Bottomley : I ask my right hon. and learned Friend, who makes a fair point, to consider that when the employment legislation comes forward it should be made retrospective to this month. We would hate any suggestion of people in the offshore industry, or in any other, being inhibited in speaking plainly on safety matters. I will not ask my right hon. and learned Friend for an instant response, but I ask the Government to consider that aspect.

Also, the legislation that would be required under an ordinary employment Bill could be relatively simple. It might be possible for a Back Bencher in any part of the House to present a Bill which, if it raised no objection and was simple, could go through the House and another place without difficulty. I do not expect my right hon. and learned Friend to answer immediately, but perhaps he will consider those suggestions and answer at the end of the debate, or in a day or two.

Mr. Howard : My hon. Friend was kind enough not to ask for an immediate response to his points. He sought an assurance about the retrospective effect of any such legislation. I cannot hold out any great hope of any breach in any constitutional principle and precedent to that extent. I repeat my earlier point : the safety aspects are currently covered by the arrangements for anonymous complaints to be made.

My hon. Friend suggested also that it might be possible for a Back Bencher to bring forward appropriate legislation. As I understand it, it is the intention of a Back-Bench member of another place to introduce legislation that purports to cover the point. It would not do so satisfactorily, and it is technically defective. However, I am prepared to listen to the debate in another place in relation to that legislation, and to take into account the points made this afternoon, before determining the Government's final attitude to the Bill that is to be brought forward in another place.

Mr. Dalyell : Perhaps I may disabuse the Secretary of State on the question of anonymous complaints. A number of right hon. and hon. Members represent consitutents who work in the North sea, and know very well the reality of anonymous complaints. If one rings the HSE, one is asked, "Where, when, and who?" If one cannot answer, one is bombed out and is told that as there is no proof, the complaint cannot be backed up. On one occasion, I revealed, with the consent of the person involved, the full nature of the complaint. The next time round, such an individual has it taken out on him. Life is

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pretty rough. The Secretary of State talks about anonymous complaints being a kind of safety valve, but that is not how it works in the North sea.

Mr. Howard : The hon. Gentleman does not give full credit to the Health and Safety Executive and its ability to investigate. If a health and safety risk, a breach of regulations or some other undesirable practice is drawn to the executive's attention, it has widespread powers to investigate, and it does so. I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not wish to give the impression that it is pointless for complaints to be drawn to the attention of the Health and Safety Executive, as I believe that that would be very damaging to the cause of safety. It is not pointless, and I want to encourage the making of complaints to the HSE, so that they can be investigated properly.

As I have said, we shall take into account everything that has been said this afternoon, and also what is said in another place, before finally determining our attitude to the legislation that is being presented in another place.

Mr. Blair : If we tabled an amendment in Committee to deal with the victimisation point, and if that amendment was in order, would the Secretary of State at least undertake to accept it?

Mr. Howard : If that is possible--which I doubt--we shall of course give it careful consideration. The hon. Gentleman may conclude, however, that the legislation being presented in another place is a more promising vehicle, although I do not think that it is very satisfactory in its present state.

Let me make a further point about victimisation. If a safety representative has been victimised to the point of being unable to carry out his functions, the installation operator and owner are in breach of the Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989 as things stand, and enforcement action can be taken on that basis.

Other recommendations involving work force involvement in safety are aimed principally at the industry : they refer to the involvement of the whole work force, the role of first-line supervisors and line management. These matters are an essential part of an effective safety management system, recommended by Lord Cullen as one of the key features of the safety case. These recommendations will be implemented by the forthcoming safety case regulations and accompanying guidance. I shall outline the purpose of the safety case in a moment ; the Health and Safety Commission is making this its first priority.

The task before us is extensive. Lord Cullen himself said recently that

"nobody could underestimate the magnitude of the task which faces the Health and Safety Executive".

Much, therefore, remains to be done, in particular to improve and reform the existing health and safety legislation which applies to offshore installations.

Lord Cullen saw two main elements. First, regulations should be made to require the operator of every offshore installation, fixed or mobile, to submit a "safety case" for acceptance by the Health and Safety Executive. I repeat that that is taking top priority. The commission plans to issue a consultative document, with draft regulations and guidance, on 24 February. The new regulations would be implemented progressively for new and existing installations, starting in 1993.

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The second main element recommended by Lord Cullen was that existing offshore health and safety legislation should be progressively replaced by new regulations. Those new regulations should set operators objectives to be achieved, rather than prescribing detailed measures to be taken. Lord Cullen called them "goal-setting" regulations. They will underpin the new safety case regime by defining the necessary standards to apply to every installation.

The purpose of the Bill is to pave the way for the second of those main legislative tasks--the reform of existing offshore health and safety legislation. In doing so, it implements recommendation 18 of Lord Cullen's report, and enables new regulations to be developed by the Health and Safety Commission to implement many other recommendations. The Bill is an essential step towards constructing the new goal-setting regulatory regime. It will not of itself alter the existing regime ; it deals with the technical legal changes that are necessary to allow the development of the goal-setting regime to take place. It is an important first stage in the process. Let me now briefly outline the main provisions of the Bill. The primary objective of clause 1 is to make existing offshore safety legislation into what the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 refers to as "existing statutory provisions". That will allow the existing offshore safety legislation to be replaced progressively by new regulations made under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. Clause 2 extends the "general purposes" of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act to cover the safety of onshore pipelines and the prevention of damage to such pipelines ; and the protection of the public from the dangers of the transmission and use of gas. Clause 3 contains a number of provisions consequential on clauses 1 and 2. The principal change removes any requirement for the Secretary of State for Energy to consider safety when exercising his licensing functions. This is to effect the "clean break" between the Secretary of State for Energy's petroleum exploration and development licensing regime and health and safety, as recommended by Lord Cullen. But clause 7(3) provides for revocation to come into force only by my order. I can give the House an assurance that that will not be done until the safety case regulations are in place, considerably strengthening the safety regime.

The Government have also taken the opportunity presented by the Bill to introduce measures relating to penalties for health and safety offences, security and application of the Bill's provisions to Northern Ireland.

Dr. Godman : Will the Minister give way on clause 4 ?

Mr. Howard : I am just coming to clause 4, if the hon. Gentleman will contain himself.

I know that many right hon. and hon. Members are particularly interested in clause 4, which deals with penalties for certain health and safety offences, whether on or offshore. Prosecution is, of course, only one of the enforcement tools available to inspectors. But prosecutions have an important part to play and the Government continue to be committed to good health and safety standards, supported by significant penalties for those who fail to meet those standards. The main provisions in the clause will raise the maximum penalties in two categories.

The first category of offences is under sections 2 to 6 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, for which the

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maximum fine that a magistrates court may impose will be increased from £2,000 to £20,000. The maximum penalty for these offences in a Crown court of an unlimited fine will remain unaffected. Offences under these sections are likely to be more serious than other offences, and therefore more deserving of a higher penalty, because cases are brought under them when there is a general failure to manage health and safety adequately.

The second category of offences is failure to comply with an improvement or prohibition notice, or to comply with a court remedy order made under section 42 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. For these offences, the penalties on conviction will be increased in a magistrates court from the current maximum of £2,000 to a maximum fine of £20,000, or six months imprisonment, or both. On conviction in a Crown court, these offences will carry a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine or two years imprisonment, or both. These offences are especially serious because they show at best culpable neglect and at worst deliberate flouting of a duty under law by the employers, despite specific issues having been brought to their attention by an inspector. Of course, the increased maximum penalties will also apply to cases taken in sheriff courts in Scotland. I suspect that that may be the point that the hon. Member for Greenock and Port Glasgow (Dr. Godman) wishes to raise.

Dr. Godman : Will the Secretary of State confirm that under this clause proceedings can be instituted in sheriff courts in Scotland and, perhaps, in the High Court? With regard to the Piper Alpha tragedy, many of us firmly believe that the directors of Occidental should have been brought to the High Court in Edinburgh to face a charge of culpable homicide. That was not possible, because there is no vicarious responsibility in cases of this kind. The Secretary of State mentioned Crown courts in England and sheriff courts in Scotland, but what of the High Court in Scotland?

Mr. Howard : The hon. Gentleman is raising a slightly different point when he introduces the issue of vicarious liability. I shall have to check the precise jurisdiction of the High Court in Scotland on these matters, but in England proceedings can be brought in both magistrates courts and Crown courts, depending upon the seriousness of the offence.

Mr. Dalyell : It would be unreasonable to expect the Secretary of State to make pronouncements on Scots law, but it would be useful if there were to be a statement from the Crown Office on its attitude to these matters. They are not hypothetical but very real and very important matters.

Mr. Howard : The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland --my hon. Friend the Member for Eastwood (Mr. Stewart)--who is on the Front Bench at the moment, will have heard the hon. Gentleman's question and will no doubt take it into consideration. Every accident is a tragedy not just for the person injured but for family, friends and colleagues. Accident prevention must be the first priority for employers, workers and the regulatory bodies. These new penalties are a signal to those with health and safety duties that the Government are determined that those duties should be taken seriously.

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Mr. Peter Bottomley : Can my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that responsibility both for the safety case and for the safety of workers and sub-contractors' employees will always remain with the employer and the operator and that in no sense will the health and safety inspectorate take responsibility?

Mr. Howard : Not only does safety remain the responsibility of the operator, but the purpose of the legislation is to reinforce that responsibility and to increase the penalties for failure to discharge it.

Clause 5 deals with security of oil and gas installations. Similar statutory provision already exists for the telecommunications, electricity and water industries. The clause is closely modelled on those provisions, which have proved satisfactory to date. The purpose of the clause is to empower the Secretary of State--in this case my right hon. Friend, the Home Secretary to issue directions to operators of an offshore installation, onshore terminal or oil refinery to maintain their security. Before issuing any such directions, the Home Secretary would be required to consult the operator concerned and the Health and Safety Executive.

Clause 6 deals with the parliamentary mechanism for extending the provisions of the Bill to Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland has a separate system of health and safety law, and it is therefore appropriate for the Bill's provisions to be applied to Northern Ireland as necessary by a separate Order in Council. Clause 6 provides for the use of the negative resolution procedure, enabling this to be done with the minimum possible delay soon after the Great Britain legislation becomes effective.

Clause 7 deals principally with the short title of the Bill and the necessary repeals. For the most part, the Bill will come into effect on Royal Assent. The exceptions are those parts dealing with the model clauses --to which I have already referred--and those parts dealing with gas safety. Clause 7 also limits the application of the Bill to Great Britain.

I hope that I have left the House in no doubt that the Government intend to fulfil their commitment to implement all of Lord Cullen's recommendations. The Bill and the Health and Safety Commission's forthcoming consultative document on the safety case regulations are evidence of our concern and intention to implement as fast as we possibly can. Where specific proposals are not being implemented at once it is for good and valid reasons. Our priority is to set in hand, as soon as possible, the major safety improvements recommended by Lord Cullen, and that is what we are doing.

The Bill is an important part of the implementation of the recommendations of the Cullen report on the Piper Alpha disaster, providing for the highest standards of offshore safety for those who work in our vital oil, gas and related industries. It is an essential underpinning of the offshore safety regime, outlined and recommended by Lord Cullen, and depending on the integrity, commitment and excellence of our Health and Safety Commission and Health and Safety Executive. I recommend the Bill to the House.

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4.42 pm

Mr. Tony Blair (Sedgefield) : This is an important Bill, and at the outset I wish to pay tribute to my hon. Friends, both Front-Bench and Back- Bench Members, who have done so much to campaign on the issues relative to it. Their work has been of invaluable assistance throughout.

On 6 July 1988, on the Piper Alpha platform, there occurred the worst disaster in the history of offshore oil production. Of the 226 men working on the platform, 165 died. A further two--members of the crew of the Sandhaven fast-rescue craft--were killed in a brave attempt to rescue survivors. Following the obvious and natural public outcry over the disaster, an inquiry was established. Chaired by Lord Cullen, it lasted more than a year. Lord Cullen's report has rightly been the object of very wide praise, and in this regard I entirely concur with the remarks made by the Secretary of State. Lord Cullen made 106 recommendations about improvement of the offshore oil safety regime for the North sea. This Bill represents one part of the implementation of the Cullen recommendations. Although there are reservations, and in one case an important addition that we would canvass, we support the Bill in general, of course, and want to see it introduced quickly.

North sea oil is, and has been, of fundamental significance to the United Kingdom economy. It generates wealth to the Exchequer, profit to the oil companies, and employment for many thousands of people. However, it must be said that oil production is a frontier industry. Its employees work in extreme conditions, often in circumstances of great danger, and in a market that is both volatile and highly competitive. There must be no possibility at any time of profit being put before the welfare of those in the industry who create the profit. Those brave men and women who work offshore are entitled to the highest possible standards of safety and to the full guarantee of the state that it will police those standards, enforce them rigorously and prosecute any who break them.

The Piper Alpha disaster revealed failures in the formulation and application of those standards at almost every level--failures in the safety systems, in the personnel implementing them, and in Government supervision of them. The Cullen report pointed out those failures, and its recommendations were designed to deal with them. The central point that we would make, however, is that it is not merely in the form of legislation or in the writing of the rules that safety will be secured. The form must be accompanied by the content, and the writing by insistence on implementation down the line on the offshore platforms, where it really matters.

I recall very clearly becoming the shadow Secretary of State for Energy shortly after the Piper Alpha disaster. Obviously, the matter was very much in the minds of all those working in the industry. It became clear to me, first, that, certainly at a senior executive level, a severe shock had been suffered throughout the industry as a result of Piper Alpha. There was total commitment, on paper at any rate, to a review of safety procedures. But, equally--and this is the point--the men working on the platforms were often faced with down-the-line management which was under enormous pressure and which the men said was willing to take liberties with the rules. I think that I am

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right in saying that about two thirds of those working on the Piper Alpha platform were contractors not directly in the employment of the companies themselves.

We can have the very best onshore safety procedures in the world, but they are useless unless they are followed by managers offshore, down the line. It should be said that there is still considerable concern among the men about whether the theoretical commitment of senior management to offshore safety is shared by all those who have the practical job of implementing it and extracting the oil. A claim made repeatedly throughout the Cullen inquiry, by trade unions and others representing the men, was that there was widespread intimidation of employees with respect to safety matters. In particular, it was claimed that those raising safety issues could in certain instances be regarded as troublemakers, and the letters "NRB"--not required back--could be entered on their employment card. It is said that those subject to NRB were, and are, effectively black-listed in respect of employment. It is in the nature of those claims that they are difficult to prove, but it is clear that they exist and are genuinely believed by many working in the industry, and often by those representing the workers.

Such feelings were bound to be especially acute when, in many cases, the men were denied the full involvement of their trade unions at the workplace even though they believed that such involvement was an essential part of the guarantee of good safety standards. I simply say to the Secretary of State that these pressures still exist. Indeed, they may well intensify, as, I understand, a feature of the most recent oil exploration and production is that, although the amount extracted will be greater, and although the production period will be longer than was originally thought, the new developments tend to be on smaller fields. Therefore, the costs of extraction are greater, and pressure on profit and cost is more intense. That is why we must examine all related issues raised with a determined scepticism to ensure that the fine promises made are delivered in the necessary way.

The accident on Piper Alpha occurred at about 10 pm on 6 July when there was an explosion in the C module caused by the ignition of a low-level cloud of condensate that had leaked from the condensate injection pump. One pump had tripped and another pump, A pump, was started up. Unknown to the operators, the pump had been shut down for maintenance and its pressure safety valve was off. Instead, at the site of that valve was a blind flange assembly, which should have been leak tight. However, it was not, so the condensate escaped. The operators should have known of the unsuitability of the pump through the permit-to-work system by which essential work is regulated through permits. In this instance, the permit to work had been suspended as the maintenance work was incomplete, but it appears that that fact was not properly communicated to the operators. The condensate that leaked ignited and the explosion in C module led to a fire in B module about 20 minutes later--at about 10.20 pm there was a second explosion. As the Cullen report found, there was no systematic attempt to evacuate accommodation. Survivors essentially made their own escape ; there were problems with standby vessels, and training for evacuation and fire fighting. It would not be putting it too strongly to say that those who survived did so mainly through luck and their own devices.

There were failures within the safety system, and of procedures for dealing with the consequences of a disaster

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once it had occurred. Responsibility for policing the offshore safety regimes of the oil companies on the platforms lay mainly with the Department of Energy, although other organisations did have some locus in relation to different safety aspects.

In his report, Lord Cullen dealt with the record of the Department of Energy in relation to inspections on Piper Alpha by saying that the findings of inspections done in the year preceding the disaster as a result of an earlier incident.

"were in striking contrast to what was revealed in evidence at the Inquiry. Even after making allowance for the fact that the inspections were based on sampling it was clear to me that they were superficial to the point of being of little use as a test of safety on the platform. They did not reveal a number of clear cut and readily ascertainable deficiencies. While the effectiveness of inspections has been affected by persistent under- manning and inadequate guidance, the evidence led me to question, in a fundamental sense, whether the type of inspection practised by the Department of Energy could be an effective means of assessing or monitoring the management of safety by operators."

Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse (Pontefract and Castleford) : My hon. Friend may not be aware that, prior to the Piper Alpha disaster, divers' associations, in evidence to the Select Commmittee on Energy, expressed concern that the programme of inspection and maintenance was influenced by the price of oil. If the price dropped, inspections were shoved back towards the five-year period and did not take place annually as they should have done. Will the Minister say whether that practice still exists?

Mr. Blair : My hon. Friend raises an important point. There is anxiety throughout the industry that, in a volatile market where profits fluctuate tremendously with the price of oil, there is always a danger that corners are cut. I mention to the Secretary of State, although I do not expect an immediate response, that there has been concern among deep sea divers about the effect of European safety regulations on the operations of deep sea divers. Perhaps if I or one of my hon. Friends writes to him he will investigate the matter. There can hardly have been a more comprehensive criticism of each stage of the procedures affecting safety than that made by Lord Cullen. His recommendations bear out the severity of the criticism and cover every part of the operations. Although this is something of an oversimplification, there are effectively two parts to Lord Cullen's recommendations : first, the transfer of regulatory powers from the Department of Energy and other organisations to the Health and Safety Executive, and the full application of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 to offshore work ; secondly, the development of a new regime of offshore safety, through the formulation of safety cases prepared by platform operators in respect of each installation, to be certified by the Health and Safety Executive, which will cover all aspects of offshore safety. Trade unions, many of my hon. Friends and other interested parties have long campaigned for the Health and Safety Executive to undertake responsibility for offshore safety and the regulations previously in the hands of the Department of Engery. The Burgoyne committee produced a minority report more than a decade ago, under the lead of two trade union representatives, Mr. Lyons and Mr. Miller. It specifically called for such a transfer to be

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made. Clause 1 of the Bill is designed to achieve that aim which we clearly welcome. The Bill should enable a much clearer chain of command and implement the idea of one agency to cover all aspects of safety.

The Health and Safety Executive will bring forward regulations under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. Safety will be central to those regulations, which will deal both with the design of the operation and its safety procedures, including the permit-to-work system and temporary safe refuge.

Mr. Dalyell : I am not a great one for saying, "I told you so" but, following discussions with Mr. Miller, I had an Adjournment debate on the precise subject of the minority report. I urged the Government of the day to do exactly as he wished. Had that been done, the story might have been a little less tragic.

Mr. Blair : My hon. Friend makes a valuable point in respect of the transfer of the safety regulations to the Health and Safety Executive. The position was always strange and unsatisfactory, first, because the Department of Energy was close to the producer interest and, secondly, a plethora of organisations, not just the Department of Energy, dealt with safety aspects. It was unsatisfactory that more than one agency should handle safety matters.

The safety cases are due to be updated every three to five years. In addition, new regulations under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act cover construction, fire fighting and standby vessels--all aspects in which key problems were identified. Another secton of the safety case will involve training for emergencies--an important deficiency recognised by Lord Cullen.

There is one conceptual difference between the Cullen recommendations and the usual method of procedure : the notion of the regulations being not prescriptive, but goal-setting, so that their flexibility allows them to deal with varying circumstances. Judgments will be made as to the practical effect of each safety case in turn rather than an attempt being made to legislate for every last detail.

That process may be sensible, but it will surely have the consequence of contralising the inspection and enforcement procedures of the regulatory organisation. It is a judgmental system and it will require the most careful investigation before a judgment is made. That, in turn, puts pressure on the staff and financing of the Health and Safety Executive.

We have been told that, by 1994-95, the section of the Health and Safety Executive that deals with offshore safety will have a budget of about £35 million and staff of more than 400. I trust that those additional staff and resources will not be taken from anywhere else in the Health and Safety Executive. The programme should be carried through as quickly as possible. By 1994-95 it will be six years or more since the Piper Alpha disaster. I appreciate that there have been staff recruitment problems, but the additional staff should be in place as soon as possible. If the process is to involve goal-setting regulations, rather than prescriptive procedures, it is vital that there are the necessary staff and resources to implement the proposal properly.

There are two substantial points about the detail of the Bill. Clause 5 will permit the Secretary of State to give directions to preserve the security of any installation. He is then obliged to lay before Parliament a copy of the direction

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"unless he is of the opinion that disclosure of the direction is against the interests of national security or the commercial interests of any person."

The Secretary of State knows that concern has been expressed in the other place about a possible conflict between the issue of safety, the security of the installation and the direction that might be given under clause 5. That makes scrutiny of any direction all the more important. To protect it for national security is one thing, but to protect it for commercial interests is another. I hope that the Minister will respond to that point.

The second fundamental point became the subject of exchanges during the speech by the Secretary of State. Unless there is action, we must register strong disagreement with the Government's course. Recommendation No. 30, one of Lord Cullen's crucial recommendations, was that safety representatives should be protected against victimisation by a provision similar to section 58 of the Employment Protection Act 1978. It is important to understand that section 58 protects employees against dismissal for trade union activities. Most importantly, it also provides that the two-year qualifying period to claim unfair dismissal does not apply in the circumstances of dismissal for trade union activities. The protection is immediate and the penalties are far larger than those for ordinary cases of unfair dismissal.

Lord Cullen believed that immediate protection should apply in respect of complaints about safety as it applies in respect of dismissal for trade union activities. That is vital because if a safety representative can be dismissed or disciplined because of complaints about safety, a major part of the safety regime is subject to collapse. Recommendation No. 30 is missing from the Bill. We have heard the explanation from the Secretary of State today. If there is truly a procedural bar, we should investigate it carefully because I cannot believe that it is beyond our wit to frame an acceptable amendment which would implement recommendation No. 30. We will do our best to frame such an amendment.

The more substantive point made by the Secretary of State is that victimisation is an employment issue rather than a safety issue. In our view, it is plainly a health and safety matter if someone is victimised as a result of complaining about health and safety matters. It is an employment matter, but it is also a matter that has a direct bearing on the efficacy of the safety regime. If people can be disciplined in such a way, clearly there is something deeply wrong with the safety regime that is being implemented by the company. The Secretary of State has not given an acceptable reason for not legislating.

Dr. Godman : The fears of offshore workers are widespread. At my most recent surgery, a constituent came to see me with a specific concern and complaint about standby vessels and the unsuitability of some of them. He implored me to give no suggestion of his identity and he said that even referring to a "constituent" might place his job in some jeopardy. Those decent, honourable and fine men are very frightened of the wrath of their employers if they bring complaints to light, even to Members of Parliament in their surgeries.

Mr. Blair : The House will have heard my hon. Friend's point. Hon. Members who have constituents who work offshore are familiar with such cases. It is deeply worrying that such practices continue. My hon. Friend underlines the point that I have sought to make, which is that,

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however many regulations one has, if there is not proper protection for people making complaints, it becomes difficult for the regulations to be implemented. It is a matter of deep concern. I met some people in Newcastle a short time ago who work offshore. They had no axe to grind, but they believed that they had been subject to blacklisting by companies as a result of trade union activities or for raising matters in relation to safety. It is in the nature of things that such claims are difficult to prove. However, the clamour and the degree of complaint are such that we should be unwise to treat the matter other than seriously.

The absence of a clause embodying recommendation No. 30 is a considerable worry. North sea oil contracts are often short-term contracts, so it is especially important that such a clause is included. Procedural matters may be involved, but I believe that the clause should be added because its absence will have an effect both on the estimation of the Government's sincerity in introducing the Bill and on the efficacy of the regime as a whole.

No prosecution has resulted from the Piper Alpha disaster, and it would not be right to complete a Second Reading debate without raising that point. I am advised that a prosecution could have been brought either under the specific regulations dealing with offshore matters or under the general provisions of the health and safety legislation relating to safe places of work and to safe systems of work. The case was fairly clear. On the basis of the Cullen report, the permit-to-work system was subject to repeated failures, the fire water system was flawed in spite of an audit recommendation before the disaster that it should be changed, and the training for emergencies was deficient. In general, Lord Cullen found that the Occidental management

"adopted a superficial attitude to the assessment of the risk of major hazard."

In those circumstances, it is scarcely believable that no prima facie case could be found against the company or against anyone connected with it in relation to the disaster. I ask the Minister to deal with the point about the absence of prosecutions when he winds up the debate.

We seek answers on the staffing and resources of the Health and Safety Executive, the impact of clause 5 on the safety regime, the absence of the Cullen report's recommendation No. 30 and the failure to prosecute. Those matters do not vitiate our support for the Bill, but they are serious and they require answers. Those points bring us back to the recurring theme of all debates since the Piper Alpha disaster. The Piper Alpha disaster arose out of massive deficiencies of safety management, supervision and regulation. On the face of it, the Government are committed to remedying those deficiencies in accordance with the Cullen report. However, among many who work in the industry, whatever the Government's acceptance in theory of the need for radical change, there remains doubt about the practical implementation of that radical change.

It would be wrong not to welcome the Bill, but it would equally be wrong not to signal eternal vigilance on our part until every last recommendation of the Cullen inquiry is implemented and acted on so that the 30,000 people or more who even now work offshore to produce the nation's oil do so in conditions of safety. They deserve no less.

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5.8 pm

Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman (Lancaster) : I welcome the Government's commitment to offshore safety not only on my own account, but on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) who, because of his ministerial responsibility, cannot speak on the matter although he has it very much at heart. I was glad that the Government immediately accepted the 106 recommendations of the Cullen report. It always seemed to me a rum do that safety was not in the hands of the Health and Safety Executive and I am glad that one of the first things that the Government did in April 1991 was to take administrative steps to remedy the situation. I am glad that the Bill, which will transfer statutory responsibility, is before the House.

I am glad that the penalties are to be so substantially increased and that they are to include a hefty slice of imprisonment. People working in an industry as wealthy as the oil industry might turn up their noses at a fine, or brush it off light-heartedly. They will not brush off a term of imprisonment of six months, still less of two years. As the Minister said, those who are culpably negligent, despite the instructions of the inspectors, deserve the maximum sentence of two years.

I would not do the job that these men do for all the tea in China. They are quite exceptionally brave, not just on the rigs but in travelling to and from them. It must be a nightmare for them and it must be at the back of their families' minds. I hope that the helicopters by which they are transported will be examined most carefully.

Mr. Salmond : The hon. Lady has made a good point about the penalties for the breach of health and safety regulations. What penalties would she think it appropriate to apply to a company found to have discriminated against an employee because he has raised a safety concern?

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